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Fundamentality, interdefinability,
and circularity 
Three ideas on Hohfeld examined
María Beatriz Arriagada Cáceres
 
1 Introduction
1 Discussions  regarding the  structure  of  concepts  are  often determined by  an implicit
agreement with one of two different models: (i) the reductive or containment model, in
which concepts are complex structures composed of other more basic concepts and (ii)
the connective, inferential model, in which concepts are complex structures related with
other concepts through a type of inferential disposition.1 The fact that these two models
are different does not mean that they are incompatible or exclusive; 2 it also does not
mean that they cannot be combined. 3
2 The question about the structure of  legal  concepts has a  classic  and very influential
answer  in  Hohfeld’s  model.4 One of  the  main characteristics  of  this  model  is  that  it
combines reductive and connective analyses. 
3 Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 35-36 and 64) identifies eight fundamental legal concepts to which
all other legal concepts could be reduced. He analyses them connectively, using a diagram
with four jural correlatives (right/duty, privilege/no-right, power/liability, immunity/
disability)  and  four  jural  opposites  (right/no  right,  privilege/duty,  power/disability,
immunity/liability).5 This diagram is illustrated in Table 1:
Correlatives  
right
duty
privilege
no-right
power
liability
immunity
disability
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Opposites  
right
no-right
privilege
duty
power
disability
immunity
liability
Table 1: Jural correlatives and jural opposites
4 The reductive character of this analysis can be appreciated via the moment Hohfeld (2010
[2013]:  27  and 64)  considers  that  more  complex legal  concepts  or  relations,  like  the
conditional sales of personalty or agency relations, can be adequately explained if they
are reduced to the concepts of right and duty, privilege and no-right, power and liability,
and immunity and disability. These are “the legal elements that enter into all types of
jural interests”; “the lowest generic conceptions to which any and all ‘legal quantities’
may be reduced”. 
5 As  Halpin  observed  (1985:  436),  Hohfeld  sustains  that  these  eight  concepts  are
comprehensive and sufficient in the sense that all legal positions can be expressed in
them. In fact, today there exists a broad consensus that all, or almost all, subjective legal
situations or positions can be reduced to different combinations or aggregates of the
eight elemental, or Hohfeldian fundamental, situations.6
6 This reductive orientation is combined with a willingness to establish the connections
that  exist  between these  eight  fundamental  concepts.  Their  simplified  expression  in
terms of relations (correlatives and opposites) between two people, would even allow us
to explain the so-called rights in rem and those rights that we assume individuals have in
opposition to all other people. In this respect, Hohfeld (2010 [1917]: 65-96) clarifies that
there are no rights over things and no rights against all people because they can both be
explained in terms of multiple relations between determined individuals. The same is
applicable to privileges, powers, and immunities. 
7 Hohfeld  (2010  [1913]:  36)  explicitly  aims  at  explaining  all  strictly  fundamental  legal
relations  through  a  scheme  of  correlative  and  oppositional  relations.  To  justify  this
connective  analysis,  he  affirms  that  since  these  relations  are,  after  all,  sui  generis,
attempts at formal definition will always be unsatisfactory or completely useless. 
8 According to the manner in which it has generally been understood, Hohfeld’s analysis is
linked to three implied theses. I will call these theses: (i) the fundamentality thesis, (ii)
the interdefinability thesis,7 and (iii) the circularity thesis. These are expressed in the
following manner: 
i. All Hohfeldian concepts are fundamental.
ii. None of these concepts can be defined without referencing its relation to another concept in
the same scheme. 
iii. Hohfeld’s analysis is circular. 
9 This paper will discuss these theses. In the second section, I will argue that from a strictly
logical point of view concerning the internal structure of the model of Hohfeld’s analysis,
the three enunciated theses are true only if they are formulated in the following manner:
(i) all Hohfeldian legal concepts are fundamental in the sense of being irreducible, that is,
they  cannot  be  logically  reduced  to  other  simpler  concepts,  nor  are  they  logically
reducible to each other; (ii) none of these concepts can be defined without referencing
other concepts that, within the same scheme, are correlative or oppositional, that is, their
Fundamentality, interdefinability, and circularity
Revus, 35 | 2018
2
logical equivalents or their logical contradictions; and (iii) from a logical point of view,
Hohfeld’s analysis is circular.
10 In the third section of this paper I will make explicit the assumptions that are implicit in
Hohfeld’s analysis. I will argue that this analysis assumes that: (i) right, duty, privilege,
and no-right are first-order positions and power, liability, immunity, and disability are
second-order positions;  (ii)  the positions  of  duty,  privilege,  power,  and disability  are
active and the positions of right, no-right, liability, and immunity are passive; and (iii)
privilege, no-right, disability, and immunity are, in contrast to duty, right, power, and
liability, purely negative positions in the sense that they lack conceptual autonomy. I will
show that: (i) the distinction between first-order and second-order positions supposes a
distinction between two types of legal norms and a distinction between two types of legal
acts;  (ii)  the  distinction  between  active  and  passive  positions  presupposes  that  all
correlative  relations  are  constituted  by  a  position  that  is  definable  in  relation  to  a
position-holder’s conduct or acts and a position that cannot be defined in relation to its
position-holder’s  conduct  or  acts,  but  rather  in  relation  to  its  correlative  position-
holder’s conduct or acts; and (iii) the four purely negative Hohfeldian positions assume an
ambiguous  use  of  the  concept  of  negation,  without  providing  a  clear  or  definitive
justification. 
11 In the fourth part of this paper, I will show that the analysis of these implicit suppositions
allows us to understand how Hohfeld assumes a point of view that transcends the strictly
logical view of the internal structure of his analysis to focus on the practical utility of his
concepts, that is, the way in which this model responds to the expectations of those who
can use it. I will argue that from this point of view, the three theses under discussion are
false because: (i) the correlative concepts of privilege and no-right and the correlative
concepts of disability and immunity, considered as purely negative, are not fundamental,
in the sense that they are derived concepts. In other words, their legal meaning cannot be
understood  without  referencing  the  correlative  concepts  of  duty  and  right  and  the
correlative concepts of power and liability that are, on the other hand, fundamental, in
the sense of being primitive - their legal meaning can be understood without referencing
derived  concepts;  (ii)  derived  concepts  cannot  be  defined  without  referencing  their
relation with primitive concepts, which in contrast, can be defined without referencing
their relation to derived concepts; and (iii) from the point of view of the practical utility
of Hohfeldian concepts, Hohfeld’s analysis is not circular because the primitive concepts
constitute the only starting point for his analysis.
 
2 Considering Hohfeldian concepts from a logical
point of view 
12 Strawson (1992: 17-20 and 22-23) has described the model of connective analysis as one in
which the appropriate comprehension of each concept from a network or system can
only be obtained by understanding its relation to other concepts in that system. One of
the  advantages  of  adopting  this  model  is  that  there  is  no  reason  to  worry  about
circularity, and consequently, about concluding that it is impossible to completely define
a concept without referencing another concept from the same system. In this context,
Strawson makes plain that “irreducible” does not mean (nor imply) “simple.” A concept
may  be  complex,  in  the  sense  that  its  explanation  requires  the  establishing  of  its
Fundamentality, interdefinability, and circularity
Revus, 35 | 2018
3
connections with other concepts, but also, and at the same time, it may be irreducible in
the  sense  that  it  cannot  be  defined,  without  circularity,  in  relation  to  those  other
concepts with which it is necessarily related. 
13 This is one way of understanding Hohfeldian concepts. According to Halpin (1985: 436),
Hohfeld argues that all of his scheme’s concepts are fundamental, and in this manner he
tries to put forth the idea that they are all irreducible, since they cannot be broken down
into  more  basic  concepts  and so  can only  be  expressed in  terms of  their  reciprocal
relationships. 
14 Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 27, 36 and 64) does effectively say that the concepts of right, duty,
privilege,  no-right,  power,  liability,  immunity,  and disability  are  the  “lowest  generic
conceptions  to  which  any  and  all  ‘legal  quantities’  may  be  reduced,”  “the  basic
conceptions  of  the  law,”  “the  strictly  fundamental  legal  relations,”  or  “the  lowest
common denominators of the law.” 
15 If these affirmations are interpreted as the eight concepts being irreducible, in the sense
that they cannot be reduced to (or defined in terms of) other more basic legal concepts,
Hohfeld would then have had no other choice but to establish them as being in reciprocal
relationships, and as a consequence, his analysis would be circular. The three theses that
we are discussing would be implicated in the following manner:
i. The eight Hohfeldian concepts are fundamental,  in the sense of being irreducible, which
means  that  they  cannot  be  reduced  to  (or  defined  in  terms  of)  other  more  basic  legal
concepts. 
ii. Since  they  are  irreducible,  none  of  them  can  be  defined  without  referencing  their
relationships with other concepts from the same scheme. 
iii. As none of them can be defined without referencing their relationships with other concepts
of the same scheme, Hohfeld’s analysis is inevitably circular. 
16 However, it is important to point out that even if Hohfeldian concepts are irreducible,
that does not imply that they are absolutely irreducible or that it is impossible to reduce
them. The legal concept of duty, for example, could be reduced to the empirical concept
of the probability of sanction. On the other hand, saying that none of the Hohfeldian
concepts can be defined without referencing its relationship to another concept from the
same scheme, also does not imply that it is impossible to define them in another manner.
Similarly,  positing that  Hohfeld’s  analysis  is  circular  doesn’t  imply that  his  concepts
cannot be analysed in a non-circular manner.
17 First, we should remember that after identifying the eight legal concepts he considered
fundamental, Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 36) justifies his decision to analyse them in a scheme
of correlative and oppositional relationships based on the belief that efforts at formal
definition  would  always  be  unsatisfactory,  or  even  completely  useless.  Due  to  the
fundamental nature of these concepts, connective analysis for Hohfeld is not the only
option, but it is the best option. 
18 Second,  it  is  also important  to remember hat  the connective option that  supposedly
determines the circularity of his analysis is limited to only two types of logical relations.
From a strictly logical  point of  view, Hohfeld’s strategy was to show that correlative
terms are two legal positions than entail each other and that opposites terms are two
legal  positions  that  negate  each  other. 8 In  other  words,  correlatives  are  logical
equivalents and opposites are logical contradictories.9
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19 According to Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 38 and 2010 [1917]: 73), if an individual has a right
against another individual who shall not do a certain act, the correlative (and equivalent)
situation is that the second individual is under the duty, towards the first, to not do that
act. The right of the first individual is only one phase of the total relation between both
parties and the duty of the second individual is another phase of the same relation. The
whole “right-duty” relation may be viewed from different angles. 
20 The same can be said about other Hohfeldian correlative concepts. In relation to powers
and liabilities, Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 55-60) states, for example, that if A mails a letter to B
offering to sell him/her a former’s land and such letter is duly received, then a power has
been created as regards B and a correlative liability as regards A. A’s liability is just the
correlative of power and a power is nothing but the correlative of liability. As related to
other  concepts,  Hohfeld  (2010  [1913]:  39  and  60)  posits  that  the  correlative  of  the
privilege of an individual to do a certain act is the no-right of another individual that the
first does not perform that act, and that the correlative of an immunity or exemption is a
disability (no-power).
21 Since  correlativity  in  Hohfeld  just  means mutual  entailment,  none  of  the  implied
elements  in the relationship have priority  over  the other.  The existence of  one is  a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the other.10
22 Correlatives represent two sides of the same coin, in the sense that they express only one
relation, but from two different points of view. Consequently, the two diverse statements
that refer to this relationship are logically equivalent.11 Saying that X has a right against
Y that Y do Z, is equivalent to saying that Y has a duty to X that Y do Z. Saying that X has
a power against Y that X change Y’s legal position or situation, is equivalent to saying
that Y has a liability with respect to X that X change Y´s legal situation. 
23 The correlativity of legal positions is not, for Hohfeld, a contingent conclusion obtained
from empirical data, but rather a stipulative definition. Correlativity is an axiom, and this
is nothing more than a tautology for anyone who adheres to Hohfeldian definitions.12
24 An  analysis  of  oppositional  relationships  has  the  same  definitional  and  axiomatic
character. According to Hohfeld (2010 [1913):  39),  a privilege or a liberty is the mere
negation of a duty the content or tenor of which is precisely opposite of the privilege in
question. This means, as Williams (1956: 1135-1142) has shown, that a Hohfeldian liberty
is the denial of the duty of doing something (liberty not) or the denial of the duty of not
doing something (liberty).  In Rossian terms (2000 [1968]:  165),  permission to omit an
action  means  that  there  is  no  obligation  to  perform that  action,  and  permission  to
perform an action means that there is no obligation to omit it. 
25 Stating that someone has the Hohfeldian privilege of not doing X (of abstaining from X) is
equivalent to saying that he/she has no duty to do X, and saying that someone has the
Hohfeldian privilege to do X is equivalent to saying that he/she has no duty not to do X
(to abstain from X). 
26 Since the negation of a duty implies the negation of a correlative right, the position of
privilege implies a no-right. Affirming that X has a privilege against Y that X not do Z is
equivalent to affirming that Y has a no-right on X that X do Z. Affirming that X has a
privilege against Y that X do Z is equivalent to affirming that Y has a no-right on X that X
not do Z.
27 Something similar could be said about the relation immunity/disability. Hohfeld (2010
[1913): 60) states that a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that a
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right does to a privilege or liberty. An immunity is one´s freedom from the legal power of
control  of  another  as  regards  some legal  relation.  This  means  that  immunity  is  the
negation of a liability. However, unlike what happens with privilege, an immunity denies
a liability of the same content, not a liability of opposite content.13
28 Saying that X has an immunity against Y is equivalent to saying that X is not liable with
respect to Y. As the negation of a liability implies the negation of the correlative power or
competence, the situation of immunity implies that of disability. Saying that X has an
immunity against Y, (or, what would be the same, saying that X is not in a position of
liability with respect to Y) is equivalent to saying that Y is incompetent (does not have
the power) to alter X’s legal situation.
29 This logical perspective supports the conclusion that all Hohfeldian concepts are on the
same level and are interdefinable in terms of their correlatives and opposites.14 
30 The conclusion that all concepts are on the same level points to the fact that Hohfeldian
concepts are not reciprocally reducible;  that is  to say,  no Hohfeldian concept can be
logically  reduced  to  another  Hohfeldian  concept.  Halpin  (1985:  443)  refutes  this
conclusion, sustaining that the concepts of privilege and no-right are reducible to the
negation of the concepts of duty and right. This would seem to show that the Hohfeldian
concepts of privilege and no-right, and not those of duty and right, are superfluous and so
could  not  be  considered  fundamental.  From  this  perspective,  the  notion  that  all
Hohfeldian concepts are on the same level would not hold up. But Halpin is confusing
“logically reducible” and “logically interdefinable.”15
31 The  conclusion  that  all  Hohfeldian  concepts  are  interdefinable  in  terms  of  their
correlatives and opposites connotes that none of these concepts can be defined without
referring to those other concepts that, within the scheme, are their logical equivalents or
contradictions. The conclusion that follows from all of this is that Hohfeld’s analysis is
circular. 
32 The theses that we are discussing can be considered true if they are formulated in the
following manner:
i. All of the Hohfeldian legal concepts are fundamental in the sense of being irreducible; that
is, they cannot be logically reduced to other more basic concepts and are not reducible to
each other. 
ii. None of these concepts can be defined without referencing other concepts that, within the
same scheme, are their correlatives or their opposites; that is, their logical equivalents or
contradictions. 
iii. From a logical point of view, Hohfeld’s analysis is circular. 
 
3 The implicit underpinnings of Hohfeld’s analysis 
33 Hohfeld’s discourse is not ascriptive, but descriptive of subjective legal positions.16 The
object of his analysis is constituted by statements, formulated by jurists and judges, that
try to describe the legal positions that the norms of a legal order ascribe to a determined
class of subjects. I mean that when it is stated, for example, that a certain class of subjects
has a right to Z, it means that in the legal order there is a norm that ascribes to that class
of subjects the right to Z. 17 
34 What Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 35-36) is trying to do is show that in this context the terms
“right” and “duty” are frequently used to designate different situations that should be
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distinguished: right (or right in its strict sense); privilege, power and immunity, and duty
(or duty in its strict sense),  no-right,  liability and disability.  Situated in this manner,
among  propositions  about  norms  that  ascribe legal  positions  to  subjects,  Hohfeld’s
analysis presupposes a series of implicit underlying assumptions. 
35 Hohfeldian scholars have contributed to completing this task, especially through efforts
to  show  that  Hohfeldian  positions  can  be  classified  into  two  groups.  From  a  first
perspective, it is considered that right, duty, privilege, and no-right are primary or first-
order positions, while power, liability, immunity, and disability are considered secondary
or second-order positions. From a second perspective, it is affirmed that the positions of
right, privilege, power, and immunity are active, while the positions of duty, no-right,
liability,  and  disability  are  passive.  From  a  third  perspective,  it  is  considered  that
privileges,  no-rights,  immunities,  and  disabilities  are,  in  contrast  to  those  of  rights,
duties, powers, and liabilities, purely negative positions. 
36 The coexistence of these three classifications does not constitute a problem because they
are not incompatible, but rather, complementary. However, upon closer examination of
each of these perspectives, omissions, errors, and doubts are discovered, which must be
resolved. The third section of this paper is dedicated to this task, with the goal of making
explicit the implicit assumptions in Hohfeld’s analysis. 
37 The first part of this section explores the first of these classifications; specifically, seeking
to clarify and provide complementary information about the criteria that support it. I will
argue that the differentiation between two diverse families within the Hohfeldian scheme
(positions and relations of a first order and positions and relations of a second order) is
fundamentally based on two distinctions implied or presupposed in Hohfeld’s analysis.
The first is between two types of legal norms, while the second is between two types of
legal acts. 
38 In the second part of this section I will critically analyse the second classification. In
particular, I will discuss the criteria that supports it, as well as, and consequently, the
composition of each of the families that originate from these criteria. According to this
classification,  the  Hohfeldian  positions  of  right,  privilege,  power,  and  immunity  are
active, in the sense of being positive, favourable or advantageous, while the Hohfeldian
positions of  duty,  no-right,  liability,  and disability  are passive,  in the sense of  being
negative,  unfavourable,  and  disadvantageous.  Refuting  the  evaluative  nature  of  this
classificatory criteria and identifying a new criteria that is values-neutral and strictly
formal – that would appeal to how a legal position is defined, by referring to its position-
holder’s  conduct  or  acts  (active)  or  the  correlative  position-holder’s  conduct  or  acts
(passive) –, will help to discard the idea that the active and passive Hohfeldian positions
make up two families,  and also to reformulate the composition of  each one of  these
families. I will argue that, in agreement with these proposed criteria, duties, privileges,
powers,  and  disabilities  are  active  positions,  while  rights,  no-rights,  liabilities,  and
immunities are passive positions. 
39 Finally, in the third and last part of this section, the third classification will be analysed.
Specifically two forms of  understanding the purely negative character or the lack of
conceptual autonomy that is attributed to the Hohfeldian concepts of privilege, no-right,
immunity, and disability will be reviewed: (i) as concepts that describe the content of
legal norms, and (ii) as concepts that describe the absence of these norms. I will argue
that in explaining these concepts, Hohfeld ambiguously uses the concept of negation and
cannot offer a clear and definitive justification for this ambiguity. This could be because
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these concepts are founded (a) on the assumption that the legal systems that ascribe the
analysed  positions  are  complete  and coherent,  or  (b)  on  the  thesis  that  there  is  no
pragmatic difference between situations constituted by a lack of norms and situations
constituted by norms, or (c) on simply not recognizing the doubts and problems that said
ambiguity produces. 
 
3.1 First-order and second-order Holfeldian positions and
relations: two types of legal norms and two types of legal
acts
40 Hohfeldian legal positions and relations are usually classified into two different families.
The positions of right, duty, privilege, and no-right are considered primary, or of a first
order,  and  the  positions  of  power,  liability, immunity  and  disability  are  considered
secondary, or of a second order.
41 Guastini (2016: 84-87) states that the first family’s situations are primary because they
represent the content of common norms of conduct that discipline citizens’ behaviours.
The  second  family’s  situations,  however,  are  secondary  because  they  represent  the
content of norms about the legal production that disciplines modalities that create and
modify the norms of conduct, which, in turn, give way to primary situations. The first
family’s situations have a logical priority over those of the second family’s.18 
42 In a similar sense, although without referencing the norms that compose them, Wenar
(2005: 230-233) understands that the positions of either family are being distinguished by
their object. Privileges and rights are, in a strict sense, first-order positions because they
are over objects, like the privilege of an individual to not move his/her body or his/her
right to not be touched. Powers and immunities are, on the other hand, second-order
positions because they refer to the positions of a primary order.
43 What these authors apparently do not recognize is that the first-order positions can,
although not necessarily, refer to second-order position and that these last positions can,
although not necessarily, give way to other second-order positions.
44 Kramer  (2000  [1998]:  20)  recognizes  this  when  he  affirms  that:  (i)  some  first-order
relations  applied  directly  to  people’s  conduct  and  social  intercourse  without  the
mediation of any second-order relations, and (ii) all second-order relations apply directly
to people’s entitlements and only indirectly (but crucially) to people’s conduct and social
intercourse.  In  the  same manner,  Rainbolt  (2010:  3)  sustains  that  powers,  liabilities,
immunities and disabilities are second-order relations because they necessarily concern
the ability or inability to make changes in other Hohfeldian relations.  Rights,  duties,
liberties (privileges) and no-rights are, on the other hand, first-order relations because
they do not necessarily concern changes in other Hohfeldian relations. 
45 However, what these authors fail to clearly distinguish are the two different types of acts
that legal positions and legal relations, from either family, can or must be defined in
relation to, nor do they relate this distinction to the two different types of norms.
46 To clarify the criteria that allow us to differentiate between the two families within the
Hohfeldian scheme,  we must  first  note  that  there  are  two relevant  distinctions  that
underlie Hohfeldian analysis (or, in this sense, that this analysis anticipates). The first
distinction is between two types of norms: (i) regulative or prescriptive norms and (ii)
norms of competence or about legal production. The second distinction is between two
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types of legal acts, which, by stipulation, I will call: (i) non-normative legal acts and (ii)
normative legal acts.19
47 Although, in this paper, I cannot delve too deeply into the debate that accompanies this
effort  to distinguish between two types of  norms,20 the criteria used to map out the
distinctions implicit in Hohfeldian analysis have to do with the way in which the different
norms are related to the conducts that they refer to, and this is expressed in the very
different  consequences  that  derive  from  their  observance/following  or  their
inobservance/not-following:21 
i. Regulative norms are those that qualify, in a legal system, the doing or the not-doing of
determined acts, or the consequence or no-consequence of determined ends, as a result of
which, from their observance or inobservance, their validity or invalidity does not follow.
ii. Competence norms are those that determine or constitute, in a legal system, the possibility
of  producing,  modifying,  or  overturning  valid  legal  norms  or  participating  in  their
production, modification or overturning, as a result of which, the consequence of following
them is validity and the consequence of not following them is invalidity.
48 The first part of the definition of regulative norms coincides with the characterization
that Von Wright (1963: 7-8 and 70-92) makes concerning prescriptions and regulations,
except for the fact that here the content of the norms is not only restricted to acts and
activities,  since  normative  authority  can  qualify  the  obtaining,  or  the  abstention  of
obtaining, certain ends.22 The second part of the definition is negative. It alludes to the
consequences that don’t follow from the observance or inobservance of the regulative
norms because not all regulative norms, not even those that establish obligations, impose
sanctions. 23
49 The definition of competence norms24 assumes that: (i) a norm is legally valid when it has
been  produced  in  conformity  with  the  (competence)  norms  that,  in  a  legal  system,
determine the possibilities of producing it25 and (ii) competence is nothing more that the
possibility that certain norms in a legal system attribute to a subject (body or individual)
the possibility of producing or participating in the production of valid legal norms, in the
conditions  determined  by  these  same  norms.26 This  definition  includes  norms  that
determine the competent subjects for producing norms in a determined material scope of
regulation  and  those  norms  that  determine  the  conditions  for  the  exercise  of  that
competence  (the  procedure  that  must  be  followed  and  the  content  limits  that  the
resulting norms cannot go beyond). 
50 As any human conduct can be described in purely physical terms or in terms of body
movement, that is,  without being interpreted,27 the classificatory criteria of legal acts
implicit in Hohfeldian analysis is whether their performance and the consequences that
follow due to  their  performance,  have  been or  not  been determined by competence
norms:28 
i. Non-normative legal acts are those whose performance and the consequences that follow
from the performance, have not been determined by competence norms. These acts can be
performed,  described  and  understood  without  referencing  any  norms,  but  they  can  be
qualified by regulative legal norms.29
ii. Legal  acts  are  normative  (creating,  modifying,  or  overturning  norms)  when  their
performance and  the  consequences  that  follow  from  their  performance have  been
determined by competence norms, in the sense that they can only be performed, described,
and understood in accordance with them.30
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51 None of this impedes that once defined, normative acts can be qualified by regulative
norms. It’s one thing to confer a competence or a normative power, but quite another to
regulate  the  exercise  of  that  competence  or  power.31 Exceeding  competence norms
produces invalidity. Violating norms of conduct involves liability, like other violations of
obligation.32 The  power  to  produce  norms  can  also  be  simultaneously  obligatory  or
permitted.33 
52 The implicit  use that Hohfeld makes of  these distinctions justifies the differentiation
between two families of legal positions that exist within his scheme of correlatives and
opposites.  Hohfeldian concepts presuppose concepts of  regulative norms,  competence
norms, normative legal acts, and non-normative legal acts. The concepts or positions of
right, duty, privilege, and no-right are explained in terms of regulative norms and acts
that can be normative or non-normative. The concepts and positions of power, liability,
immunity,  and disability are explained in terms of competence norms and normative
acts.34
53 As Duarte d’Almeida (2016: 558-559) observes, from this point of view, these two families
of  concepts  are  independent  in  the  sense  that  a  statement  that  affirms  or  denies  a
position in  one of  the  families  does  not  imply  a  statement  that  affirms or  denies  a
position in the other. In this sense, for example, the legal power of making changes in
legal relations does not entail the liberty or privilege of making or not making these
changes; one can be under the duty not to exercise one’s power, as much as under the
duty to exercise it.
54 Effectively, and in a similar manner to how Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 39, 43 and 58) affirms
that from the mere existence of liberties it does not follow that third parties are under a
duty not to interfere, he also affirms that it is necessary to carefully distinguish between
the legal power, the physical power to do the things necessary for the exercise of the
legal power, and the privilege of doing these things, if such privilege does really exist. It
may or may not. 35
55 The positions of right and duty are instituted by regulative norms and can have as an
object non-normative legal acts. In this case they are first-order positions because the
acts that constitute their object can be performed, described and understood without
referencing any norms. The positions of privilege and no-right that negate these position
of right and duty refer to the same object and, consequently, are also of the first order. 
56 The positions of power and liability are instituted by competence norms that have as an
object  normative  acts.  As  these  acts  cannot  be  performed,  described  or  understood
without referencing the norms that determine their performance and the consequences
that follow, the positions of power and liability are, at least, of a second order. They are
second order if they refer to normative acts that create, modify or eliminate first-order
positions. They are third order if  they refer to normative acts that create,  modify or
eliminate secondary order positions, and so on. The positions of immunity and disability,
that oppose the positions of power and liability, refer to the same object, and so, also
have the same level of hierarchy.
57 The positions of right and duty instituted by regulative norms can refer to normative
acts, in which case they are, at least, of a third order. They are third order if they qualify
normative  acts  that  are  an  object  of  second-order  positions  that  create,  modify  or
eliminate first-order positions. They are fourth order if they qualify normative acts that
are the object  of  third order positions that create,  modify or eliminate second-order
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positions, and so on, successively. The positions of privilege and no-right, that oppose the
positions of right and duty, refer to the same object and consequently also have the same
level of hierarchy.
58 The hierarchy of a Hohfeldian position or relation depends on the type of act to which it
refers. A position or relation is first order if it has for an object a non-normative act. A
position or relation that has as an object a normative act will be second, or superior
orders, depending on the hierarchy of the position or relation that the normative act
creates, modifies or eliminates.
59 This  explains  how the  Hohfeldian  positions  and  relations  of  the  first  family  can  be
(though not necessarily) first order and that those of the second family cannot be first
order because they are, at least, second order. 
 
3.2 Hohfeldian active and passive positions: the Hohfeldian
thesis of correlativity
60 Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 35-36) shows that the expressions “right” and “duty” are frequently
used when designating diverse situations that should be differentiated in order to avoid
confusion. This well-recognized and valued exercise in disambiguity36 has given way to
the interpretation that Hohfeld would have tried to differentiate two families within his
scheme of analysis: one family of active positions and one family of passive positions, as
seen in Table 2: 
Active positions  right – privilege – power – immunity
Passive positions  duty – no-right – liability - disability
Table 2: The usual division of the positions in active and passive 
61 However, this interpretation adopts diverse forms from which diverse conclusions follow.
Some examples will serve well as illustrations.
62 Carrió  (1992:  9-10  and  13-15),  for  example,  states  that  Hohfeld’s  central  idea  was
establishing two families of expressions or words linked with the pairing of the terms
right and duty, in ways both obscure and complex. The language of law allows each one of
these terms to preside over a family of related words whose relations between each other
are not clearly defined.  Examining an abundant quantity of  current uses would have
permitted Hohfeld to note the modalities hidden by the indiscriminate use of the word
“right” are active and the modalities hidden by the indiscriminate use of the word “duty”
are passive.
63 Hierro (2000:  355-356) partially attributes to Hohfeld the ability to begin to conceive
rights  in  a  wider  sense  and more in  tune with the habitual  uses  developed in  legal
language.  Today  we would  know that  that  which we name as  “rights”  are  different
positions or situations of a subject whose conduct is regulated by norms, and that the idea
that these are “rights” implies the conviction, even from the internal point of view within
norms,  that  these  are  all  situations  that  favour  the  subject’s  capacity  to  act.  In
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juxtaposition, we find the different situations that we call “duties” as being implicitly
considered to be negative because they limit the subject’s capacity to act. 
64 It  is  worth emphasizing here that from the moment Hohfeld recognized this outlook
concerning jurist’s actual use of these terms, an openly values-based consideration of
Hohfeldian legal positions has been developed.
65 It  is  assumed,  for  example,  that  Hohfeld’s  positional  concepts  are  formulated  in
concordance with the assumption that rights,  privileges,  powers,  and immunities are
active positions, in the sense of being positive, favourable, or advantageous, and that
duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities are passive positions, in the sense of being
negative,  unfavourable,  or disadvantageous.  This basic polarity,  essential  to Hohfeld’s
thinking, would appear to show the presence of an intrinsic values-based element within
his  scheme.37 From this  point  of  view,  neither  the  rules  that  confer  power  nor  the
regulative  rules,  by  themselves,  would  allow  us  to  understand  how  the  positions’
justifications operate as a background or foundational aspect. In this sense, then, we must
go beyond the rules when responding to the question of what justifies or legitimizes that
some positions are active or positive and others are passive or negative.38
66 What a values-based consideration of Hohfeldian positions overlooks is that the idea that
these  express  determined  values  or  legitimate  interests  is  incompatible  with  the
structural  and formal  character of  Hohfeld’s  analysis,  whose objective is  precisely to
avoid the common tendency of  confusing positions or situations that law ascribes to
certain classes of subjects with goods or interests that these positions protect. 
67 Hohfeld’s  (2010 [1913]:  27)  starting point lies  in warning us about the importance of
distinguishing between purely legal relations versus the physical and mental facts that
call such relations into being; legal elements versus non-legal elements when considering
any problem. This warning is identical to Kelsen’s (1987 [1923]: 507 and 539-540): the law
is not substance (what is protected), but form (the protection). In Guastini’s (2016 [2014]:
83) terms, a subjective legal position or situation is just the subjective dimension of a
norm, which is to say it is just what the norm ascribes to a subject, for example, a right or
a duty.
68 The concepts used for referring to these positions should be distinguished from the extra-
legal foundations that justify their attribution by the norms of law. Elucidating these
concepts and their reciprocal relations is a task for analytically conceived law theory.
Justifying the justice or convenience that determined subjective positions are or are not
attributable by the legal order to certain classes of subjects, is a task for the political
philosophy of law.39 This does not mean that there is no relation between these two tasks.
40 As Hohfeld’s project, more than being empirical or substantive, is analytically purifying
and definitional, it cannot be empirically refuted, nor it is susceptible to moral objections.
41 However, the neutrality of its analytical framework is precisely what serves to show the
substantive differences within different political-moral theories.42 
69 From an exclusively formal and thus neutral in this sense perspective, the Hohfeldian
positions can be classified as being active or passive, but the classificatory criteria and the
members that belong to these two categories are very different. Ergo, it is not appropriate
to say that they constitute two “families”. 
70 The key to understanding this resides in the Hohfeldian thesis of correlativity. Since for
Hohfeld, correlativity means mutual implication, the correlative concepts express one
relation from two different angles or points of view and the two statements that can refer
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to them are logically equivalent. This explains why Hohfeld assumes that all correlative
relations are constituted by an active legal position and a passive position, which function
like a battery’s two poles. 43
71 A legal position is active if it is defined by referencing its position-holder’s conduct or
acts. In contrasting form, a legal position is passive when it is not defined by referencing
its  position-holder’s  conduct  or  acts,  but  rather  by  referencing  the  correlative  legal
position-holder’s conduct or acts. In this context, it is not strange that passive positions
are always defined in relation to the active positions that are their correlatives. 
72 Once we have correctly formulated the classificatory criteria, it is inappropriate to talk
about  two  families,  although we  can  simply  say  that  duties,  privileges,  powers,  and
disabilities are active positions,  while rights,  no-rights,  liabilities,  and immunities are
passive positions.
Active positions  duty – privilege – power – disability
Passive positions  right – no-right – liability - immunity
Table 3: Reformulation of the habitual division
 
3.2.1 Duties and rights
73 Saying that X has against Y a right that Y do Z is equivalent to saying that Y has a duty to
X to do Z because the position of right is passive and the position of duty is active. The
position of right is passive because it is not defined by referencing its position-holder’s
conduct, but by referencing the correlative duty position-holder’s conduct. The position
of duty is, in contrast, active because it is defined by referencing its position-holder’s
conduct. For this reason, Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 37-38) defines the concept of right or claim
simply as an invariable correlative of the concept of duty or obligation that, in exchange,
admits to being defined, without referencing the concept of right,  as that which you
should or should not do. 
74 Effectively, Hohfeldian rights are not active rights to do anything, but passive rights of
respecting a situation or receiving something from someone else.44 A claim-right can
entitle its bearer to protection against harm or paternalism, or to provision in case of
need,  or  to  specific  performance  of  some  agreed-upon,  compensatory,  or  legally  or
conventionally specified action.45 Rights allude to actions or omissions of the correlative
duty position-holder. There is no such thing as someone’s right to do or refrain from
doing anything.46 A statement that a person has a right to do something means that he/
she has a right in the strict sense, not to be interfered with in doing it.47 A statement that
affirms that someone has the right to not do something means that another person is
obligated to not demand that he or she does it. 
75 The Hohfeldian concept of rights is, in this sense, identical to the concept of reflex-right
identified by Kelsen (1991 [1960]: 139-134 and 147) who, rejecting the distinction between
personal rights and rights in rem, plainly states that what is usually called exercise or
enjoyment of rights is really only the correlative obligation. However, in opposition to
Kelsen, Hohfeld doesn’t offer any pronouncements about the possibility of existing duties
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that are not correlative with rights.48 Consequently, he doesn’t weigh in on whether it is
possible  or  not  to  consider  that  indirect  or  absolute  obligations,  like  those  that  are
generally imposed by criminal law, are correlative to rights.49
76 It  follows,  then,  that  Duarte  d’Almeida  (2016:  560)  is  correct  when  observing  that
relational character is not a part of the conceptual content of duty when Hohfeld affirms
that Y’s duty to stay off X’s land is correlative (and equivalent) to the right that X has
against  Y  that  he  shall  stay  off  the  former’s  land.  As  Hohfeld’s  approximation  is
stipulative and definitional,50 one could respond by saying that his definitions only refer
to direct or relational legal positions.51 However, the consequence that follows from this
is that Hohfeldian concepts are not comprehensive.52 
 
3.2.2 Powers and liabilities
77 What has been stated about rights and duties is also valid for the correlative pair of power
and liability, except for the fact that here there is no similar problem related to indirect
duties, since the positions of power and liability are both relational. 53
78 According to Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 50-51 and 60), the position of power is that in which
the person (or persons) whose volitional control is paramount may be said to have the
(legal)  power to effect a particular change in the legal  relation in question.  It  is  the
affirmative control  that an individual  exercises over another individual  and within a
given legal relationship.
79 Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 51-55) is primarily thinking about the modification of relations like
those between a vendor and a vendee that have complied with all of his/her obligations
except for the payment of the last instalment of a conditional sale, between the person
that offers and the one who receives a contractual offer, or between the principal and the
agent in cases of agency. However, he also admits that agent’s powers are comparable to
those of public officers, like the power of a sheriff to sell the property under a writ of
execution. For this reason, Ross (2012 [1958]: 168 and 2009 [1968]: 132) is right to suggest
that citizens are subjected to the power of legislators in the same way as the one who
makes an offer is subjected to the power the recipient, or the way in which inheritors are
subjected to the power of the testator.
80 Saying that X has the power to perform a normative act that changes Y’s legal situation,
is equivalent to saying that Y is liable with respect to X’s power to perform a normative
act that changes Y’s situation because the legal position of power is active and the legal
position of liability is passive. The position of power or competence is active because, in
contrast to liability, it is specified by referencing its position-holder’s conduct or act.54
This explains why Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 50-60) has defined the concept of liability simply
as a correlative of the concept of power, a concept that, as we have seen, can be defined
without referencing the concept of liability. 
81 It is very important that relational character is part of the content of power and liability.
We should not confuse ourselves with the idea that the exercise of a power can change
the legal situation for the person who exercises it55 because the change in one´s legal
situation implies a change in the legal situation of the other and vice versa. According to
Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 51), a property owner has the power to extinguish his/her own legal
interests (rights,  powers,  immunities,  etc),  through abandonment and, simultaneously
and correlatively, has the power to create in other persons privileges and powers relating
to the abandoned object, like the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriating it. 
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3.2.3 Privileges and no-rights, immunities and disabilities 
82 Similarly, the positions of privilege and no-right, on the one hand, and those of immunity
and disability on the other hand, are also correlatives. The position of privilege implies
that of no-right and the position of immunity or exemption implies that of disability. In
this  sense,  Hohfeld  (2010 [1913]:  39)  affirms,  for  example,  that  the  correlative  of  an
individual’s privilege of doing a certain action is the no-right of another individual that
the first individual shall not do that action. 
83 Taking this into consideration, liberties (privileges) are like powers because they have to
be specified by reference to the liberty-holder’s conduct,56 and immunities are like rights,
since  they  have  to  be  specified  by  reference  to  the  conduct  that  the  holder  of  the
correlative position (disability) does not have the power of doing.57 In other words, while
liberties and powers are exercised, rights and immunities only are merely enjoyed.58 
84 From this point of view, saying that X has against Y the liberty or the privilege to do Z, is
the equivalent of saying that Y has no right on X that X not do Z because the legal
position of privilege is active and that of no-right is passive. Affirming that X is disabled
from doing a normative act that changes the legal situation of Y, is the equivalent of
saying that Y has against X an immunity because the position of disability is active and
that of immunity is passive.
85 In this context, it is not surprising that Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 38-39 and 60) has defined
the active concept of privilege as the opposite or the negation of the active concept of
duty, previously defined, and that in contrast he has defined the passive concept of no-
right simply as the correlative of the active concept of privilege. In a similar manner,
while the active concept of disability is defined as the opposite or the negation of the
active concept of power, previously defined, the passive concept of immunity is defined
as the correlative of the active concept of disability,  or through an analogy with the
active  concept  of  liberty  or  privilege.  The  passive  concepts  are  always  defined  by
referencing the active concepts that are their correlatives. 
 
3.3 The purely negative character of the concepts of privilege, no-
right, immunity and disability: the Hohfeldian thesis of opposition 
86 The comparison of privileges with powers and immunities with rights, which we are able
to do by applying the idea that privileges are exercised and immunities are enjoyed,
bypasses an important difference: unlike the relations of right/duty and power/liability,
the  relations  of  privilege/no-right  and  immunity/disability  are  considered  purely
negative. We have seen that, in accordance with Hohfeld, a relation of privilege/no-right
is the negation of a relation of duty/right, of a content precisely opposite, and that a
relation of disability/immunity is the negation of a relation of power/liability of the same
content.59
87 Although the use of the concepts of negation and opposition has stimulated quite a few
doubts and criticisms,60 what interests us here is pointing out the fact that Hohfeld does
not explicitly define, in terms of norms of a legal order, what it means for an individual to
be in the positions of privilege, no-right, disability, or immunity. 
88 What  is  not  clear is  if  Hohfeld  assumes  that  the  relations  of  privilege/no-right  and
disability/immunity  describe  the  content  of  legal  norms  that,  respectively,  establish
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exceptions to the relations of duty/right previously instituted by regulative norms and
exceptions to the relations of power/liability previously instituted by competence norms.
Or, instead, if he assumes that the relations of privilege/no-right and disability/immunity
represent the respective absences of these same regulative and competence norms. As I
shall  explore  in  the  following  section,  both  interpretations  have  been  defended  by
Hohfeldian scholars.
89 From this first perspective, the relations of privilege/no-right and disability/immunity
are  not  ascribed  to  subjects  by  norms.  The  situation  of  liberty  (privilege),  whose
correlative is a no-right, and the situation of immunity, whose correlative is a disability,
occupy exactly the same places in their respective groups or families because they are, as
Hart (1983 [1953]: 35-36, footnote 14 in that paper) suggests, negative cases where there is
no law to interfere in if the individual chooses to do or abstain from some action (liberty)
or to retain his legal position unchanged (immunity). 
90 Ross (2009 [1968]:119-125, 128-130, 133-134) appears to be situated in this same line of
thinking,  explaining  legal  modalities  in  relation  to  the  Hohfeldian  scheme,  and  so
sustaining that the concept of permission is identical to Von Wright’s weak permission,
which simply means that the act is not forbidden.61 This situation, whose correlative is a
no-claim (no-right), is distinguished from the situation called “liberty” that occurs every
time  an  act  is  legally  indifferent  because  it  has  not  been  prohibited,  nor  declared
obligatory.62 As the sphere of liberty is defined negatively as everything that is not the
object  of  legal  regulation,  it  would not  be possible to enumerate the liberties  that  a
person has, except in the particular ways in which these appear as exceptions to general
rules. Despite the fact that Ross presents the situations of immunity and disability as
analogues to those of permission and no-claim, in order to describe the first, he uses
terms similar to those employed to describe legally indifferent conducts. He affirms that
since they are negative terms that cover everything not subject to legal power, it is not
possible  to  enumerate  or  name  specific  immunities,  except  those  that  appear  as
exceptions; for example, foreign ambassadors enjoy immunity from the courts or citizens
enjoy immunity from the legislature in those areas in which its competence is limited by
the Constitution. In summary, according to this author, every person enjoys liberty or
immunity against another, as long as this other person doesn’t have a right or a power
against the first.63 
91 In agreement with this interpretation, the Hohfeldian relations of privilege/no-right and
disability/immunity  refer,  respectively,  to  the  absence  of  regulative  norms  and  the
absence of competence norms.64 However, this is not very plausible, at least in relation to
privileges and no-rights. 
92 First,  to  explain  these  situations,  Hohfeld  uses  examples  of  privileges  or  liberties
explicitly ascribed by norms.65 Second, that an action is not prohibited simply means that
there is an absence of indirect obligation. Consequently, if a privilege is the mere absence
of a prohibition, then the position of privilege would not be relational. Third, and this is
probably the strongest reason, it is quite clear that Hohfeldian liberties or privileges do
not involve a choice. The liberty that X has against Y to go to church implies that X has no
duty with respect to Y to not go to church, but it does not imply that X has no duty with
respect to Y to go to church. X can have the liberty of complying with his/her duty to Y.66 
93 From a  second perspective,  it  is  posited  that  the  relations  of  privilege/no-right  and
disability/immunity  are  instituted  by  norms  that  establish  exceptions  to  precedence
relations of duty/right and power/liability. 
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94 If, for example, X, a land owner, authorizes Y to enter into his/her property, liberating
him/her from his/her duty of not entering, we can describe this relation through two
equivalent statements: (i) Y has the privilege or liberty of entering into X’s land and (ii) X
has a no right on Y that X not enter into his/her property. The relation of privilege/no-
right  between  X  and  Y  constitutes  an  exception  to  the  relation  of  right/duty  that
generally exists between X and Y. The term “generally” alludes to the fact that what is
most common is that, between a land owner and a non-land owner, there exists a relation
of right/duty.
95 The same could be said of the relations of disability/immunity. Citizens are subjected to
the general power of the legislature to dictate norms that create, modify, or extinguish
their subjective legal positions, but the legislature cannot (it doesn’t have the power)
eliminate the right of citizens to not be tortured. In this sense, citizens have an immunity
against the power or competence of the legislature to which they are normally subjected. 
96 Wenar (2005: 226-227 and 232) points in this direction when he affirms that the function
of a liberty (privilege) is to confer an exception from a general duty and that the function
of an immunity is to confer a protection from a general power. While ordinary citizens
have the duty not to break down doors, police officers have a privilege to break down
doors (or they have no duty not to break down doors). While Congress has the general
power  of  imposing duties  on the  citizens,  it  does  not  have  the  power  of  restricting
citizens’  freedom of expression.  This immunity protects them from Congress’  general
power.
97 Citizens’  general  duty of  not  breaking down doors  is  direct  or  relational  because its
correlative is the right of those who live in or on the other side of those doors. In the
same manner, Congress’ general power of imposing duties is direct or relational because
its correlative is citizens’ liability.
98 From this point of view, the legal positions of privilege and no-right are ascribed by
permissive norms67 that authorize certain subjects to do certain acts, freeing them from
compliance  with  previous  obligations  and,  correlatively,  they  deny  to  other  subjects
rights that were previously conferred.68 On the other hand, the positions of disability and
immunity are ascribed by norms that  revoke previously conferred powers to certain
subjects and, correlatively, they free other subjects from previous liabilities. 69 
99 This appears to be Rainbolt’s (1993: 94) position, from the moment that he affirms that a
rule is a statement that specifies or implies that someone has a claim, a duty, a liberty
(privilege), a no-right, a power, a liability, an immunity, or a disability and the legal rule
system of a country is the set of all true statements that someone has a legal claim, legal
duty, legal liberty, etc. 
100 In contrast to this interpretation, it could be said that understanding the relations of
privilege/no-right and disability/immunity as exceptions from general relations of duty/
right  and  power/liability  can  be  tricky  because it  is  possible  that  the  relations  of
privilege/no-right and disability/immunity are the general rule and not the exception.70
101 The fact that the term “special privileges” is often used, shows, according to Hohfeld
(2010 [1913]: 44-46), that just as there can be special legal advantages in favour of an
individual or a class of individuals, so too can there exist ordinary or general privileges
that the norms establish in favour of any person that finds him/herself in a determined
circumstance, like what happens in the case of privileged communications in the law of
libel.
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102 This point of view allows us to understand that Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 39) affirms that X,
owner of a land, has the privilege of entering the land (and he/she does not have a duty
to stay off), and that the correlative of this situation is Y’s no-right that X shall not enter.
71 The privilege is general in the sense that all land owners have, in general and due to
certain norms, the privilege of entering their lands (and do not have the duty of staying
off), except, for example, in the case of there being a contract where they are under the
duty to not enter. The general rule is the privilege of entering and the exception is the
duty of not entering. However, the privilege can be considered special in the sense that it
represents an exception (conferred on land-owners) to the general rule that prohibits
entering on lands. 
103 The  consideration  of  purely  negative  legal  situations  as  exceptions  to  more  general
precedence  relations  is  much  more  problematic  when  the  relations  of  disability/
immunity are analysed. According to Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 60-61), the owner of land X
has, in addition to the power to alienate it, immunity with respect to anyone else who has
not by virtue of special operative facts acquired a power to alienate X’s land. In contrast,
X lacks immunity against a sheriff that has been duly empowered by a writ of execution
to sell X’s interest and, in the same way, against the agent who has been duly appointed by
X to sell the property. X has a liability with respect to the sheriff and with respect to the
agent. This example allows us to infer that, in general and due to norms, all property
owners have immunity against each of the other individuals who are incompetent to alter
his/her legal situation in relation to that property. Immunity is the general rule and
liability is the exception.
104 This difference between privileges and immunities can also be observed in the diverse
ways in which Rainbolt (1993: 95-96) illustrates these two situations.  The situation of
liberty (privilege) is exemplified by showing that when the owner of a car sells it  to
another, he/she creates a pass that establishes that this last person does not have the
duty of not driving the first’s car next Tuesday. Normally, the second subject has the duty
of abstaining from driving the first’s and he/she has the power of changing the duty of
the second from a liberty to drive the car. The situation of immunity is illustrated, in
exchange, by referencing two individuals that do not know each other. One, a car-owner,
has an immunity against the other in the sense that there is nothing that this last person
can do to have the liberty of driving the first’s car. The rules of the legal system do not
permit her to change her duty to not drive the car into a liberty to drive it. Similarly, a
subject has an immunity against another when this last person cannot extinguish the
first’s liberty of burning the flag.72
105 Discussion  continues  about  the  correct  way  of  understanding  the  purely  negative
character of the Hohfeldian relations of privilege/no-right and disability/immunity. As
such, it  can be admitted, as Guastini (2016 [2014]:  85-87) does,  that the terms liberty
(privilege), no-right, immunity, and disability are ambiguous because they can be used to
describe the content of positive norms that institute these legal situations as much as to
describe  the  absence  of  these norms.73 What’s  more,  it  is  plausible  to  conclude that
Hohfeld uses these terms in an openly ambiguous manner and that nothing appears to
indicate that  the existence or  absence of  a  norm is  a  criteria  for  distinguishing two
different types of relations of privilege/no-right and two different types of relations of
disability/immunity.
106 One possible interpretation is that Hohfeld’s analysis presupposes that the legal systems
that ascribe the situations that he analyses are complete and coherent.74 Complete, in the
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sense that they contain a rule of closure that authorizes one to infer: (i) that, due to the
absence of norms that ascribe duties/rights, there exist norms that ascribe privileges/no-
rights, and (ii) that, due to the absence of norms that ascribe powers/liabilities, there
exist norms that ascribe disabilities/immunities.75 And, coherent, in the sense that: (i)
norms that institute a relation of duty/right and norms that institute a contradictory
relation, vis-à-vis the first relation, of privilege/no-right cannot simultaneously coexist,
and (ii)  norms that  institute a  relation of  power/liability  and norms that  institute a
contradictory  relation,  vis-à-vis  the  first  relation,  of  disability/immunity  cannot
simultaneously coexist.76
107 This would explain why Hohfeld ignores the fact that, relative to the dynamics of the
legal order in contexts where there is a plurality of normative authorities with different
competencies according to their  hierarchy,  there is  an important difference between
situations where there is an absence of norms and situations that are instituted by norms,
77 so that in practice there is no pragmatic equivalence.78 
108 Another available  interpretation is  that  Hohfeld’s  analysis  assumes precisely such an
equivalence.79 From this point of view, the fact that a conduct can change from being
prohibited to being permitted due to a norm, does not change the expectations of those
who are thinking about doing it or have done it.80 This is the same as saying that nothing
changes if, from a situation where there is no power or competence to do a determined
normative act, we arrive at another wherein said incompetence is declared by a norm
that establishes an immunity. The existence or absence of a norm would not imply there
being any difference in the normative position of the privilege or immunity position-
holder.81 
109 Another admissible interpretation, and probably the most credible, is that Hohfeld was
not aware of the doubts and problems produced by the ambiguity with which he uses the
terms considered purely negative. This is because his work was produced long before
discussions about if a difference exists, and if so, of what kind, between non-normative
situations  and  situations  instituted  by  permissive  norms  or  norms  of  disability  or
incompetence. 
110 We have seen how privileges and liberties can be considered exceptions. The privilege to
drive some else’s car is an exception to the general duty of not driving cars that are not
your own, the property owner’s privilege of entering a land is an exception to the general
rule of not entering lands and the police officer’s privilege of breaking down doors is an
exception to the general rule of not doing so. It has also be observed that considering
immunities  as  exceptions  to  precedent  liabilities  is  more  problematic  and  that  this
difference, expressed in works by authors like Ross and Rainbolt,  can also be seen in
Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 60-61); particularly when he affirms that a landowner has immunity
against any individual who has not acquired, due to special operative facts, the power to
alienate the property.
111 My impression is that this difference is justified because a relation of disability/immunity
can only be considered an exception if it is looked at from the point of view of a general
power that certain bodies have when imposing duties upon their citizens. The immunity
that a first individual has against another individual that can do nothing to change his/
her duty of not driving the first individual’s car into a liberty or privilege of driving it, to
extinguish the liberty or privilege of the first person to burn the flag or to sell the land
that belongs to the first person as a property-holder, does not constitute an exception. 
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112 The examples that Hohfeld uses repeatedly in these cases suggest that it is possible that
he has thought about the relations of privilege/no-right as exceptions to the precedence
relations of duty/right instituted by permissive norms and that, on the other hand, he
has thought about the relations of disability/immunity as simply all that is not subject to
legal  power  and,  for  that  reason,  as  situations  not  instituted  by  norms.82 Hohfeld’s
assumptions would be different, depending on the case: existence of a norm in the case of
privileges and no-rights and absence of a norm in the case of disabilities and immunities.
This, in my opinion, supports the thesis that Hohfeld did not (or could not) take into
account the discussion regarding whether there exists a difference, and of what kind,
between  non-normative  situations  and  situations  instituted  by  permissive  norms  or
norms of disability or incompetence.
113 Until this point, we have covered two plausible readings: (i) Hohfeld ambiguously uses all
negative terms, and consequently, any of them can represent the existence of a norm as
well as the absence of a norm, and (ii) Hohfeld assumes the existence of norms in the case
of privileges/no-rights and the absence of norms in the case of disabilities/immunities.
Whether  Hohfeld’s  analysis  presupposes  complete  and  coherent  legal  systems  or
subscribes to the idea of pragmatic equivalence between non-normative situations and
situations instituted by norms or simply has not taken into account these problems, the
relevant conclusion appears to be, as Guastini (2016: 85-86) affirms, that the situations of
liberty (privilege), no-right, immunity, and disability lack conceptual autonomy in the
sense that they are nothing more than the respective absence of duty, right, liability, and
competence. However, this conclusion leaves us without an answer to a very relevant
question. In discussion about negative Hohfeldian concepts, why do we assume that these
are privilege, no-right, disability, and immunity and not, instead, duty, right, power, and
liability? 
114 If  all  Hohfeldian  concepts  are  fundamental  and  interdefinable,  and  for  this  reason
Hohfeld’s  analysis  is  circular,  the  concepts  that  we  have  considered  so  far  as  being
“negative” could be the perfect points of entry for our analysis, and so, for entering into
the Hohfeldian scheme. 
115 As it was seen, according to Hohfeld and Hohfeldian scholars, a relation of privilege/no-
right is the negation of a relation of duty/right of opposite content, and a relation of
disability/immunity is the negation of a relation of power/liability of the same content.
But it would be equally correct to say the inverse, that is, that a relation of duty/right is
the negation of a relation of privilege/no-right of opposite content, and a relation of
power/liability is the negation of a relation of disability/immunity of the same content.
The problem concerning the meaning of purely negative Hohfeldian terms would consist,
then, in knowing if the relations of duty/right and power/liability describe the content of
the legal norms that, respectively, establish exceptions to relations of privilege/no-right
and disability/immunity precedent instituted by norms, or if instead, these represent the
absence of norms. 
116 The reason why this way of seeing things is implausible is not found in the logic of the
internal structure of the Hohfeldian scheme, but outside of it. To this I dedicate the next,
and last, section of this paper.
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4 Understanding Hohfeldian concepts through their
practical utility 
117 The uncovering and examination of  the assumptions in the last  section allows us  to
observe  that  the  model  of  analysis  constructed  by  Hohfeld  assumes  a  point  of  view
different  from  the  strictly  logical  that  in  contrast  emphasizes  the  way  this  model
responds to the expectations of those who can use it.83
118 In the second section of this paper it was seen that in the model that Hohfeld proposes to
analyse subjective legal  positions have a  definitional  and axiomatic  character,  in the
sense that their definitions (specifically those of correlativity and opposition) are not
contingent conclusions obtained from empirical data, but rather authentic stipulations or
axioms that, being such, cannot admit empirical refutation. It follows that those who
want to use and take advantage of this model would have no other choice but to adhere to
its definitions.  Does this mean that the conceptual instrument elaborated by Hohfeld
lacks contact with the reality of legal practice?
119 The  answer  is  a  definitive  no.  As  Carrió  (1992:  10-13)  explains  Hohfeld’s  moderate
pretension would not have been as much introducing purely stipulative definitions to
which all subjective legal situations would have to be reduced, as constructing a coherent
and economic  conceptual  instrument,  built  from a  small  group of basic  notions.  His
pretension  was  really  about  highlighting,  with  the  necessary  precision,  the  central
nucleus of meaning of current expressions used by jurists in their language; maintaining,
in a relatively strict manner, those current uses in order to reconstruct the different
fundamental legal concepts that fashionable and profuse legal jargon tends to obscure;
using  the  language  of  jurists  as  a  point  of  entry  for  rescuing,  without  any  rigid
presuppositions, the uses that effectively mark useful distinctions; showing the different
situations that can be hidden through the ambiguous use of the same term or the unity
that can be elided through the use of different terms. All of this, even though the task
required effecting partial  redefinitions in order to limit the imprecise borders of the
current  legal  terms,  or  introducing  new  terms  in  order  to  contribute  to  marking
distinctions that are effectively made by jurists, but are not adequately recognized by
them.84
120 How do we reconcile, then, the need to adequately represent85 the current uses of terms
among jurists with the need to elaborate a coherent and economic conceptual
instrument? The response is that the definitions that support the conceptual instrument
elaborated by Hohfeld are  stipulative,  but  not purely  stipulative.  As  with many ideal
models, Hohfeld’s has the objective of clearly and precisely reconstructing pre-existing
conceptual relations. Hohfeldian legal concepts are not invented. Rather, they are taken
from  ordinary  legal  language  and  reconstructed  in  a  system  that  assigns  precise
meanings and linkages through unequivocal relations. By maintaining a certain amount
of similarity with the reality that he is trying to reconstruct (current uses by jurists), he
proposes a practical utility for his system. Consequently, that this system is useful (in the
sense that  it  responds to the expectations of  those who can use it),  depends on the
conditions and assumptions that transcend its internal structure.86
121 This external or extra-systemic point of view allows us to note that the practical utility of
the  Hohfeldian  conceptual  system  depends  on  a  condition  or  assumption  the
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identification of which permits us to discuss the idea of fundamentality, and so also the
ideas of interdefinability and circularity, without denying its value from the logical point
of view of the internal structure of the Hohfeldian analytical model. 
122 The key to discussing the idea of fundamentality resides in the purely negative character
attributed to the Hohfeldian concepts of privilege, no-right, disability, and immunity and
that is not attributed to the concepts of duty, right, power, and liability. It is generally
accepted  that  the  concepts  of  privilege,  no-right,  disability,  and  immunity  lack
conceptual  autonomy,  in  the  sense  of  not  being  anything  more  than  the  respective
absence or negation of the concepts of duty, right, power, and liability. This alerts us to
the fact that there is a circumstance in which not all Hohfeldian concepts are on the same
level,  and  consequently,  that  not  all  Hohfeldian  concepts  are  equally  fundamental.
However, as should be clear, what I are really talking about in this instance are different
concepts of fundamentality.
123 As it was seen, it is true that Hohfeldian concepts can be considered fundamental in the
sense of being logically irreducible. My thesis is that, independently of this, both Hohfeld
and  Hohfeldian  scholars  implicitly  accept  that  not  all  these  concepts  are  equally
fundamental  but  understanding  "fundamental"  in  a  different  sense.  The  correlative
concepts  of  duty  and  right  and  the  correlative  concepts  of  power  and  liability  are
fundamental  in  the sense of  being primitive:  their  legal  meaning can be understood
without referencing the other four concepts. The correlative concepts of privilege and
no-right and the correlative concepts of disability and immunity are not fundamental in
the  sense  that  they  are  derived:  their  legal  meaning  cannot  be  understood  without
referencing the correlative and primitive concepts of duty and right and the correlative
and primitive concepts of power and liability.
124 The reason for this is not found in the internal structure of the scheme of logical relations
proposed by Hohfeld, but in the possibility that this schema is useful for those who may
want to use it. If this scheme took as its starting point the concepts of privilege/no-right
and  disability/immunity,  its  potential  users  would  be  confused  because,  from  the
perspective  of  how  real  legal  orders  work,  the  comprehension  of  these  concepts
presupposes the respective understanding of the primitive concepts of duty/right and
power/liability.  The  primitive  character  of  the  concepts  of  duty,  right,  power,  and
liability and the derived character of the concepts of privilege, no-right, disability, and
immunity is a presupposition of the practical utility of Hohfeld’s conceptual instrument. 
125 This idea is not at all strange and can be traced to the efforts to show that for legal
systems to comply with their function of guiding conduct, the most important thing is
not  that  they  establish  permissions  but  instead  obligations  and  prohibitions.  The
fundamental character of the normative modality of obligation is justified, as Ross (2009
[1968]:  155) affirms, because if  there were no norms of obligation there would be no
normative meaning whatsoever. What is permitted does not provide any guidance for
conduct, unless permission is taken as an exception to a norm of obligation. In this same
vein, Echave, Urquijo, and Guibourg (2008 [1980]: 157-158] sustain that permission is
inconceivable without prohibition, in the same way that silence does not exist without
noise, or uncle without nephew. Although it is logically possible to construct a theoretical
system  on  the  basis  of  permissions,  normative  orders  only  offer  utility  when  they
prohibit and because they prohibit, since, if there is no idea of limitation, it is not possible
to qualify its absence. 
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126 It  appears  that  it  could be said that  the same about  the other  family  of  Hohfeldian
situations, even when the relations of disability/immunity are the general rule and those
of  power/liability,  the exception.  If  there were no norms that  instituted powers and
liabilities, immunities and disabilities would not make any normative sense.87 Disability is
inconceivable without competence for the simple reason that if the idea of competence is
missing, it is impossible to qualify its absence. Disability and immunity are, like privilege
and no-right, derived concepts. Power and liability are, like duty and right, primitive
legal concepts.
127 This distinction between primitive and derived concepts not only allows us to look at the
problem of fundamentality from a new perspective, it is also the basis for refuting the
idea of  interdefinability,  according to which none of  the Hohfeldian concepts can be
defined without referencing its relation to other concepts in the same scheme. My thesis
is that derived concepts cannot be defined without referencing primitive concepts, but
primitive concepts could be defined without referencing derived concepts.
128 Although  defining  primitive  concepts  without  referencing  derived  concepts  is  more
complex than understanding their legal meaning, Hohfeld’s analysis does not permit us to
discard this possibility. This is because Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 36) does not affirm that it is
impossible to define his scheme’s concepts without referencing their correlatives and
oppositions.  However,  the  most  important  reason  is  that  Hohfeld’s  analysis  consists
precisely in defining: (i) active primitive concepts (duty and power) without referencing
any  other  concept,  (ii)  active  derived  concepts  (privilege  and  disability)  from  their
relationship with active primitive concepts, and (iii) passive concepts (right, liability, no-
right, and immunity) with reference to their respective active correlatives (duty, power,
privilege, and disability), as it was seen.88
129 A close  study of  Hohfeld’s  analytical  exercise  allow us  to  note  that  while  the active
concept of duty can be defined, or at least presented, without referencing its relation
with the active concept of privilege, this last concept is always defined by referencing the
first. Hohfeld does not affirm that a privilege is what one can do, or not, and that duty is
the  opposite  of  privilege,  that  is,  the  negation  of  a  privilege  of  a  content  precisely
opposite to the duty in question. According to Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 37-39), a duty is that
which one ought or ought not to do, and a privilege is the opposite of a duty, that is, the
negation of  a  duty of  content  precisely  opposite  the privilege in question.  Similarly,
Hohfeld defines the active concept of power without referencing its relation to the active
concept of disability, and this last concept is defined by referencing its relationship with
the first.  According to Hohfeld (2010 [1913]: 50-51, 58, 60),  a power is the position in
which a subject is found when the performance of a change in a legal relation depends
upon his/her will, and a disability is nothing more than the opposite of a power, a no-
power.
130 Paying close attention to the sequencing of Hohfeld’s analysis allows us to observe that
the active primitive concepts (duty and power) and their respective passive correlatives
(right and liability) are defined and at least presented before the active derived concepts
(privilege  and  disability)  and  their  respective  passive  correlatives  (no-right  and
immunity). This refutes the idea of circularity. Hohfeld’s analysis is not circular because
one must start from the primitive concepts.
131 Spaak (2003: 90) appears to point in the same direction when, in passing, he affirms that
although,  logically  speaking,  all  Hohfeldian  concepts  are  on  the  same  level  and
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interdefinable, the concepts of duty and competence (power) are the natural points of
departure  when  explaining  the  importance  of  the  eight  concepts.  According  to  this
author, we could say that duty and competence are, in this sense, the two fundamental
modes of legal regulation, but “fundamental” here does not mean irreducible, rather,
primitive.
132 If the primitive concepts (right, duty, power, and liability) can be understood and defined
without  referencing their  relationship with the derived concepts  (no-right,  privilege,
disability, and immunity), then the primitive concepts are the starting point for Hohfeld’s
analysis and consequently the obligatory starting point for understanding his analysis.
133 The reason for all of this, in my opinion, is pretty simple. If law is not substance (what is
normed or regulated),  but rather form (norms),  it  should be asked how law norm or
regulate? The answer is that it does so fundamentally (primitively), establishing relations
of duties/rights and powers/liabilities. Nothing more, nothing less.
134 It could be said, then, that the Hohfeldian concepts are fundamental and interdefinable,
and that Hohfeld’s analysis is circular only in the obvious and purely logical sense that if
a relation of privilege/no-right is definable as the opposite or the negation of a relation of
duty/right, then a relation of duty/right is definable as the opposite or the negation of a
relation of privilege/no-right. But we should not lose sight of the fact that this vantage
point obscures how the real  legal  orders that can be analysed within the Hohfeldian
schema function, and how, from this point of view, these relations are not on the same
level. The appropriate understanding of the legal meaning of a negative concept such as
privilege cannot be obtained by understanding its relation with the concept of duty if the
appropriate understanding of the concept of duty is only obtained by understanding its
relationship with privilege. 
135 It is important to distinguish the logical point of view from the practical utility point of
view when dealing with Hohfeldian concepts, and it is important to understand that both
are present in Hohfeld’s analysis. 
136 In the scheme presented in Table 4 I illustrate the Hohfeldian relations of a first and a
second order. The correlative relations are represented with the biconditional symbol (↔
). As each one of these relations involves an active concept and a passive concept, the
active concept is always the first and is put in bolded font. The oppositional relations are
represented by the contradiction symbol (⊥), and as can be observed, all of these involve
two active concepts or two passive concepts. As indicated, the concepts in the first row
are primitive and those in the second row are derived:
Table 4: First and second order relations with primitive, derived, active and passive positions 
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NOTES
1. Margolis & Laurence 1999: 5.
2. Preferring the connective model does not imply that we should renounce the idea, common to
reductive analysis, that there are basic or irreducible concepts; Strawson 1992: 20-28.
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3. An analysis oriented toward reducing concepts to other more basic or simpler concepts can be
combined with an analysis that mainly focuses on the connections between those concepts that
make up a conceptual network within a given area of study; Moreso 2004: 19-20.
4. Two essays with the same title were published in 1913 and 1917; Hohfeld 2010 [1913] and 2010
[1917]. The following texts highlight the classic character of Hohfeld’s analysis: Carrió 1992: 21;
Páramo  2000:  375;  Frändberg  2009:  8,  Vega  2015:  125  and  Guastini  2016  [2014]:  84.  On  his
importance  and  influence,  see:  Kramer  (2000)  [1998]:  7;  Wellman  2002:  171-173;  Moreso  &
Vilajosana 2004: 129; Wenar 2008: 253; Duarte D’Almeida 2016: 554-555.
5. The following synonyms will be used in an interchangeable manner, unless otherwise
indicated:  “right/claim,”  “duty/obligation,”  “privilege/liberty,”  “no-right/no-claim,”
“power/competence,” and “immunity/exemption”.
6. See, for example, Guastini 2016: 84 and Spaak 2003: 90. 
7. I  use this  denomination only as a type of  abbreviation,  because this  thesis  doesn’t  simply
affirm  that  Hohfeldian  concepts  are  interdefinable  or  definable  in  terms  of  their  reciprocal
relations. 
8. See, for example: Kramer 2000 [1998]: 8.
9. Rainbolt 2010: 4.
10. Kramer 2000 [1998]: 26. An even stronger proposal is that correlatives are simply synonyms;
Ross 2009 [1968]: 120.
11. Williams  1956:  1144-1145;  Singer  1982:  987;  Rainbolt  1993:  95;  Cruz  Parcero  2007:  33-34
(footnote number 19 in this work). “One relation is correlative to another if and only if it is true
that: (i) both relations have the same content, (ii) the object of the first is the subject of the
second relation, and (iii) the object of the second relation is the subject of the first relation, then
the relations are logically equivalent”; Rainbolt (2010): 2.
12. Kramer 2000 [1998]: 24, 30-31, 35, 40.
13. In the Spanish version of this article, I stated that an immunity denies a liability of opposite
content. I thank Professor Jorge Rodríguez for having called my attention to this error.
14. See, for example: Spaak 2003: 90 and Lindhal 1977: 203.
15. For  example,  the  interdefinability  of  the  three  normative  operators  (permitted,
prohibited, and obligatory) means that the norms “Permitted p,” “Not prohibited p,” and
“Not obligatory not p” are logically equivalent and mean the same thing. Permitted and
prohibited, as operators of these norms, are two contradictory concepts; Alchourrón &
Bulygin 1975 [1971]:173 and 175. This does not mean that the concept of permission is
reducible to the negation of the concept of prohibition. I am grateful to Professor Daniel
González Lagier for having called my attention to this difference. Another manner of
attacking the thesis  of  fundamentality without  abandoning a logical  point  of  view is
affirming that it is not true that all Hohfeldian concepts are on the same level and that
they are logically irreducible because the concepts of competence, liability, immunity,
and disability are logically reducible to the concepts of right, duty, liberty (privilege), and
no-right. Ross (2009 [1968]: 118-120], for example, declares that the concepts of right,
duty,  liberty  (privilege),  and  no-right  are  modalities  of  norms  of  conduct,  while
competence, liability, immunity, and disability are modalities of norms of competence.
Since, according to his reasoning, norms of competence are logically reducible to norms
of  conduct  because norms of  competence make it  obligatory to act  according to the
norms of conduct that have been created according to the procedure laid down in them,
any  norm of  competence  can,  through  logical  transformation,  be  expressed  without
change of meaning by any of the four modalities of the norms of conduct. In this manner,
the person that is subject to the power or competence of a second person is the same
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person that is under obligation to obey the norms created by him in the correct manner.
There is not time or space to discuss this thesis, but this observation would not change
the fact that the concepts that belong to each of these groups are interdefinable in terms
of their correlatives and their opposites, that is, in terms of their logical equivalents and
contradictions.  The  concepts  of  right,  duty,  liberty  (privilege),  and  no-right  are
interdefinable in the same way that the concepts of competence, liability, immunity, and
disability also are.
16. I am grateful to Professors Cristina Redondo and Giovanni Ratti for their help in clarifying
this point. 
17. This  type of  affirmation isn’t  circular  because the term “right”  is  used on two different
discursive levels: first, on the level of normative propositions, and second, on the level of norms.
While norms ascribe rights, the normative propositions describe the norms or the rights ascribed
by the norms. In this same vein, Alchourrón & Bulygin 1975 [1971]: 173-174, distinguish between
the  norms  that  establish  obligations,  prohibitions,  and  permissions  and  the  normative
propositions  that  describe  the  obligations,  prohibitions,  and  permissions  established  by  the
norms. 
18. Keep in mind that Ross also thinks the positions of the first family are modalities of norms of
conduct and that those of the second family are modalities of norms of competence. However, in
accordance with this line of thinking, the second are logically reducible to the first. So, on the
basis of logical transformation, any norm of competence modality can be expressed by any norm
of conduct modality without changing its meaning. See footnote 15 of this paper. 
19. On both of these related distinctions, see, among others, Hart 2012 [1961], chapters III and V
and Bulygin 1992.
20. This theoretical discussion is much more extensive because among the authors that believe
that competence norms are different and not reducible to regulative norms, it is common to find
the  consideration  that  they  are  part  of  a  wider  genre  of  what  are  called  constitutive  or
determinative rules See, among others: Von Wright 1963: 6-7 and 1975 [1971]: 151-152; Searle
1964, 2011 [1969]: 33-42 and 1995; Ross 2009 [1968)]: 53-57; Raz 1999 [1975]: 108-111; Alchourrón
& Bulygin 1991 [1983]; Schauer 1991: 6-7; González Lagier 1995: 246-264. On constitutive norms,
see also Conte 1989, 1995 and 2001; Carcaterra 1979 and 2014 and Roversi 2014.
21. There is way of grasping a rule that is exhibited, from case to case of application in what we
call  “following  the  rule”  and  in  what  we  call  “going  against  it”;  Wittgenstein  2009  [1953],
paragraph 201. The most well-known version of this argument is found in Hart 2012 [1961]: 33-35.
22. When  in  this  definition  I  say  that  regulative  norms  “qualify”,  I  mean  they  “order”  or
“permit” it to be. 
23. In this sense, the Hartian argument about the impossibility of assimilating the notions of
nullity and sanction is incomplete; see: Hart 2012 [1961]: 33-35.
24. For another, closely related, definition, see: Arriagada 2017.
25. Orunesu 2012: 119-120; Guastini 2001: 60; Kelsen 1991 [1960]: 201-208; Ross 2009 [1968]: 96.
26. Kelsen 1991 [1960]:  159-161 and 151-157; Ross 1961: 116-117 and 2009 [1968]:  124,
168-169; Atienza & Ruiz Manero 2004: 83.
27. In terms of corporal movement: González Lagier 1995: 261.
28. As proposed by Ferrajoli  2011 [2007]:  464-465, a similar distinction can be made between
informal (natural) acts and formal (artificial) acts.
29. For example, crossing the street, driving a car, or arresting a person. 
30. The actions that a legal order provides, for example, when granting a will or dictating a law
or a judicial sentence, can only be performed, described, and understood in accordance with the
norms that define the powers for validly granting a will and validly dictating a law or sentence. 
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31. For example: Ross 2009 [1968]: 131 and Atienza & Ruiz Manero 2004: 84.
32. Ross 2009 [1968]: 131.
33. Kelsen 1991 [1960]: 132; Hart 2012 [1961]: 29 and 120; Bulygin 2015 [1992]: 276.
34. An analysis that highlights the implicit use of these two distinctions in the Hohfeldian model
and its importance in the differentiation of two diverse groups of legal positions is found, with
some nuances, in Arriagada 2014: 15-19 and 2016: 155-157. Vega tells us about the Hohfeldian
scheme that  underlies  the conceptual  distinction between natural  acts  and institutional  acts
(similar  to  what  I  propose here)  and that  this  is  related to  the distinction between primary
regulative  norms  and  secondary  competence  norms.  However,  he  is  wrong  about  some
fundamental  questions  that  will  be  discussed  in  this  paper.  For  example,  he  classifies  the
Hohfeldian positions as active and passive, in the sense of positive or favourable and negative or
unfavourable and considers that Hofeldian liberty (Hohfeldian privilege) creates obligations that
don’t interfere in the subjects that are in the correlative position of no-right; Vega 2015: 125-146. 
35. Additionally, it should be clarified that saying that these two families of Hohfeldian concepts
are  independent,  in  this  context,  does  not  imply  any  assertion  in  the  context  where  the
discussion  is  whether  the  second-order  positions  are  logically  reducible  to  the  first-order
positions  (see  footnote  15).  Affirming  that  the  power  to  perform an act  does  not  imply  the
privilege of perform it belongs in a different category of analysis, not related to affirmations like,
“any  second-order  position  can,  based  on  logical  transformations,  be  expressed,  without
changing its meaning, by any of the first-order positions.” In this manner, the concept of power
is  logically  reducible  to  the  concept  of  duty,  and  saying  that  a  person  is  subject  to  the
competence of another is the same as saying that he/she has the obligation to obey that other. 
36. Following Hohfeld, it is common that one usually talks about subjective legal positions or
situations, instead of talking indiscriminately about rights and duties. See, for example: Moreso
& Vilajosana 2004: 139; Vega 2015: 113 and Guastini 2016 [2014]: 83 and ss. It is also common to
say that Hohfeld distinguishes diverse understandings of “right”; for example: Hart 1983 [1953]:
35-36 (foot note number 15 in this work); Nino 1980: 207; Rainbolt 1993 and Wenar 2005. The fact
that  Hohfeldian  terminology  has  discovered  and  eliminated  serious  ambiguities  in  the  term
“rights” justifies its virtually universal use; Rainbolt 2010: 1.
37. See, for example: Vega 2015: 140-146.
38. Vega 2015: 140-146.
39. Ross 2012 [1958]: 1-5; Carrió 1992: 19-20 and Nino 1980: 165-168.
40. Much like how the conceptual elucidation cannot be effected independently from the
elaboration of the normative theory in whose framework that concept operates, valuing
cannot take place without the previous conceptual identification of what is valued; a
process of mutual adjustments is needed; Nino 1989 [1984]: 12-13. On the other hand, one
of the characteristics of conceptual analysis is that, while that this offers explanations
about the way in which specialists use concepts of general application within their field,
it  also shows us the relations that exist  between the specialized discipline and other
intellectual and human issues; Strawson 1992: 10-14.
41. Kramer 2000 [1998]: 22. 
42. In this sense, see: Kramer 2000 [1998]: 7. The debate between theories of will and of interest is
a  confrontation  between  two  different  perspectives  about  the  extra-legal  grounds  to  confer
subjective rights; Arriagada 2014: 27-39 and 2016: 154. The most well-known exponents of this
debate are: Windscheid (1946 [1862]: 219 and ss) and Ihering (2011 [1865]: 816 and 821) and, later,
Hart (1962 [1953]: 117-119; 1955 and 1982: 183-188) and some of his disciples (MacCormick 1988
[1975], Raz 1995 [1994]: 44-55). A good summary of this discussion can be found in: Finnis 2000
[1980]: 231-233. For a description of both theories and mixed theories, see: Dabin 2006 [1955]:
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67-94. An explication of the deficiencies of each theory and the underlying ideas that both share
can be found, respectively, in Wenar 2005 and 2008.
43. I thank Professor Claudio Agüero for suggesting this metaphor. 
44. On the distinction between active and passive rights, see: Cruz Parcero 2007: 24.
45. Wenar 2005: 229-230.
46. Duarte d’Almeida 2016: 556.
47. Williams 1956: 1145. 
48. According  to  Kelsen,  not  all  cases  of  legal  obligation  suppose  the  existence  of  a  reflex,
subjective right: Kelsen 1991 [1960]: 141. In the same sense, also see: Ross 2000 [1968]: 165 and
Guastini 2016 [2014]: 86.
49. For more discussion on this topic see, for example: Hart 1982: 183-185.
50. Kramer 2000 [1998]: 23 and Rainbolt 2010: 3. 
51. In this same sense, see: Wellman 2002: 174.
52. In Duarte d’Almeida (2016: 560-561) there is a questioning of the comprehensive character of
Hohfeldian concepts, as they cannot cover indirect obligations.
53. See, for example: Guastini 2016 [2014]: 87.
54. Williams 1956: 1145 and Kramer 2000 [1998]: 21-22.
55. It is usually said that to have power is to have the ability of altering the normative situation
or oneself or another; see, for example: Wenar 2005: 231.
56. Williams 1956: 1145 and Kramer 2000 [1998]: 21-22. 
57. Kramer 2000 [1998]: 21-22. 
58. Wenar 2005: 233. One thing, however, is important to make clear: liberties or privileges can
be compared with powers or competences from this point of view, but keeping in mind that
while the concept of privilege includes the privilege of doing a legal act (positive) as well as the
privilege of abstaining from doing it (negative), the concept of power is always positive. A power
is always the possibility of doing a normative act. In the Hohfeldian scheme it is not possible to
contemplate  power  as  possibly  not  doing  a  normative  legal  act.  An  explanation  for  how
Hohfeldian privilege works is developed in the section 3.3 of this paper. On the other hand, and
as seen there, from the perspective of liberty or privilege as a purely negative concept, these are
not comparable to the concepts of power or competence. 
59. See footnote 13 in this paper. 
60. See, especially: Williams 1956 and Halpin 1985. 
61. By criticizing the Von Wright’s effort to define permission (in a strong sense) as something
more  than  the  negation  of  an  obligation,  Ross  argues  that  a  permissive  legal  rule  is  a
modificatory  exception  to  a  prohibition,  and  that  for  this  reason  it  is  interpretable  as  the
negation of an obligation. 
62. In fact, Ross affirms that a permitted act, in contrast with a free act, can be prescribed. 
63. See also Ross 2012 [1958]: 164-166 and 168.
64. Arriagada 2016: 157. 
65. As in the case of privileged communications in the law of libels or in the case of privilege
against self-crimination; Hohfeld 2010 [1913]: 44-46. However, it should be noted that while the
first example can be considered a relational position, understanding that its correlative is the no-
right of  the slandered or defamed individual,  in the second example one cannot devise who
would be in the correlative position of no-right. 
66. Williams 1956: 1139-1142 and Rainbolt 1993: 96. 
67. Kelsen  calls  them  “positive  permissions”  and  Alexy,  “explicit  permissions”;  Kelsen  1991
[1960]: 29 and 68 and Alexy 2007 [1984]:197. 
68. Guastini 2016 [2014]: 85-86.
69. Guastini 2016 [2014]: 86-87.
70. On the problem of under what conditions a norm is special, see: Zorzetto 2013: 389-386. 
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71. It is possible that due to having signed a contract, X has, in relation to Y, and in addition to
privilege, the duty to enter the building. These situations are compatible because they have the
same content. 
72. This  diverse  way  of  understanding  liberties  or  privileges  and  immunities  (the  first  as
exception and the second as general rule) is consistent with the fact that Rainbolt does not make
immunities comparable to liberties, but to rights. One of his principal ideas is that rights and
immunities  imply  normative  limits  and  restrictions  to  the  actions  of  others  because  their
correlatives (duties and disabilities) are,  in and of themselves,  limits or restrictions; Rainbolt
1993: 97-98.
73. Guastini 2016: 85-87. 
74. I thank professors Álvaro Núñez and Giovanni Ratti for their help clarifying this point. 
75. On the possibility that legal systems are incomplete unless they contain a rule of closure that
authorizes infering, due to the very fact that the norm that prohibits certain conducts does not
belong to the system (the existence of a permission in a weak sense), belonging to the system of
the  norm  that  permits  that  conduct  (the  existence  of  a  permission  in  a  strong  sense),  see
Alchourrón & Bulygin 1975 [1971]: 179. In a complete system the distinction between strong and
weak permissions disappears because all of the states of things are regulated, in the sense of
being prohibited or permitted in a strong sense, so that there do not exist states of permitted
things,  in  a  weak  sense,  that  are  also  and  at  the  same  time  permitted  in  a  strong  sense;
Alchourrón & Bulygin 1991 [1984]: 220. 
76. If a system is coherent, no state of things is prohibited and, at the same time, permitted in a
strong sense; consequently, there are no states of things that are permitted in a strong sense that
are also not  permitted in a  weak sense.  Both concepts  are superimposed upon one another;
Alchourrón & Bulygin 1991 [1984]: 220.
77. Specifically, between weak and strong permissions; Alchourrón & Bulygin 1991 [1984]: 237. 
78. According to Bulygin, it is not the same to add a norm that prohibits an action p in a system
where p is not prohibited versus in a system that contains a norm that permits p. While in the
first system no inconsistency would be produced, in the second there would be an inconsistency;
Bulygin 2010: 287.
79. I am grateful to Professor Juan Carlos Bayón for having noted this point. Regarding
the pragmatic equivalence between non-prohibition and positive permission, strong and
expressed, see, at least: Ruiz Manero 2005: 118-119; Bayón 2009 and Ruiz Manero 2010.
80. Echave, Urquijo & Guibourg 2008 [1980]: 155-158.
81. Duarte  d’Almeida  (2016:  562)  sustains  this,  due  to  the  Hohfeldian  position  of  liberty  or
privilege.
82. I thank Professor Álvaro Núñez for having helped me to clarify this point. 
83. I thank Professor Alfonso Ruiz Miguel for having pointed out that in an older version of this
paper, this point of view about Hohfeldian concepts was not clear and sufficiently differentiated
from another point of view, that I will call a logical point of view, taking into account that, from
my  perspective,  law  is  form.  His  observations  in  this  respect  obligated  me  to  improve  my
thinking regarding this point of view and what is formulated here is the result of that reflection. 
84. According to Carrió, in conjunction with this “moderate” pretence, in Hohfeld’s work one can
also identify  a  “maximal”  pretence of  isolating eight  fundamental  legal  concepts  that  would
constitute the minimum common denominators to which all conceivable legal relations could be
reduced.  Said  in  another  way,  Hohfeld  would  have  tried  to  provide  eight  near  unique  and
exclusive genres that would allow us to define, with the addition of specific case differences, all
imaginable  legal  concepts.  This  maximal  pretence,  according to  Carrió,  would be exposed to
many criticisms. One of them, of course, is that Hohfeld’s conceptual instrument is not capable of
explaining indirect obligations, like those in section 3.2.1 of this paper.
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85. The idea of adapting to current uses comes from Moreso & Vilajosana 2004: 127-129.
86. In this I am following ideas about the extra-systemic conditions of deontic logic, defended by
Echave, Urquijo & Guibourg 2008 [1980]: 145-148. 
87. Of course, here I am ignoring the Rossian idea that the concepts of power, liability, immunity,
and disability are logically reducible to the concepts of right, duty, liberty (privilege), and no-
right (see footnote 15 in this paper).
88. Section 3.2. 
ABSTRACTS
According to the way it has been generally understood, the Hohfeldian analysis of subjective
legal  positions  is  in  line  with  these  three  implied  ideas:  (i)  all  Hohfeldian  concepts  are
fundamental,  (ii)  none  of  these  concepts  can  be  defined  without  referencing  its  relation  to
another concept of the same scheme, and (iii) Hohfeld's analysis is circular. The aim of this paper
is to discuss these ideas, which I have called, respectively: (i) the thesis of fundamentality, (ii) the
thesis of interdefinability,  and (iii)  the thesis of circularity.  I  will  show that although from a
logical point of view these three theses are true, they presuppose a set of premises Hohfeld does
not make explicit: (a) right, duty, privilege, and no-right are first-order positions, while power,
liability,  immunity  and  disability  are  second-order  positions;  (b)  duty,  privilege,  power,  and
disability are active positions, while right, no-right, liability, and immunity are passive positions;
and (c) privilege, no-right, disability, and immunity are purely negative positions (as opposed to
those of duty, right, power and liability), in the sense that they lack conceptual autonomy. I will
argue that the analysis of these implicit premises allows us to understand that Hohfeld assumes a
point of view that transcends the strictly logical, and when we emphasize the practical utility of
Hohfeldian concepts, the three theses under consideration (i, ii and iii) are false.
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